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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
COREY CHATELAIN, : Case No. 20000676-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals from the denial of his untimely motion to withdraw his guilty pleas 
to automobile homicide, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-
207(2) (1999), and driving under the influence resulting in injury, a class A misdemeanor, 
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44(3)(a)(ii)(A) (1998). This Court has jurisdiction 
to hear the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly determine that it lacked jurisdiction to consider 
defendant's untimely motion to withdraw his guilty pleas? 
Jurisdiction is a question of law, reviewed for correctness on appeal. Pledger v. 
Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, \ 16, 982 P.2d 572. 
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2. Has defendant established plain error in the taking of his pleas and, thereby, 
established an exception permitting review of the merits of his untimely motion for 
withdrawal for the first time on appeal? 
No standard of review is applicable. This Court must determine de novo if "(0 an 
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993). 
3. Has defendant established "exceptional circumstances"for consideration of his 
untimely motion to withdraw for the first time on appeal? 
No standard of review applies. "Exceptional circumstances" is reserved for those 
cases with "rare procedural anomalies." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209 n.3. 
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following controlling statutes and rules is attached in Addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6 (1999); 
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 11 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 20, 2000, defendant was charged with two counts of second degree 
automobile homicide and two counts-of class A misdemeanor driving under the influence 
resulting in injury (R. 1-4,10-11). 
On March 22, 2000, a preliminary hearing was conducted (R. 21-22, 79). At its 
conclusion, defendant moved to dismiss the felony charges, claiming the evidence did not 
establish criminal negligence, the requisite intent for second degree automobile homicide (R. 
2 
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79: 56-57; R. 21-22). The magistrate continued the hearing to permit defendant an 
opportunity to brief the issue (id.). Three weeks later, on April 19, 2000, after negotiating 
a plea bargain, defendant withdrew his motion to dismiss and was bound over as charged (R. 
27). 
The same afternoon, defendant appeared before Judge Michael Glasmann (R.25-26; 
R.80: 2).1 Defendant pled guilty to one count of second degree automobile homicide and 
one count of class A driving under the influence (DUI) (R.80: 1-8). In exchange, the State 
dismissed the remaining two counts (R.80: 2, 8). 
On June 7, 2000, defendant appeared for sentencing before Judge W. Brent West 
(R.81).2 Defense counsel informed the court that defendant had just received a 
manufacturer's recall notice which stated that defendant's A.B.S. braking switch might be 
defective and should be replaced (R.81: 2-4).3 Counsel requested a continuance so that he 
1
 Defense counsel admitted that one purpose of the early plea negotiation was his 
desire to have Judge Glasmann handle the case before the judge retired (R.81: 32). 
Apparently, Judge Glasmann had not sentenced others convicted of automobile homicide 
to prison (R.81: 20-22). 
2
 Judge Glasmann had accelerated his retirement and the case was reassigned to 
Judge West (R. 29-31; R.81: 32). 
3
 The recall notice stated that if the braking switch was defective, the malfunction 
could result in "somewhat longer stopping distance;" "[i]f this occurred when minimum 
stopping distance was required, it could result in a vehicle crash" (R. 28). After receiving 
the notice, defendant called the manufacturer (R.81: 2). He was told that the 
manufacturer could not determine if defendant's actual switch was defective, "[t]hey only 
know that the modules in these series of vehicles has shown a defective condition, and 
they are replacing all of them" (R.81: 2-3). 
3 
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could formally move to withdraw his guilty pleas based on this "new" evidence (R.81: 4). 
The trial court denied the request and sentenced defendant to the statutory term of one-to-
fifteen years imprisonment on the felony, and a concurrent term of one-year on the 
misdemeanor (R.81: 14-15,33-38). 
A week later, on June 14,2000, defendant filed a "Motion to Set Aside Sentence and 
Withdraw Plea or Alternatively for New Trial" (R. 34-35). In addition to his claim that the 
recall notice constituted "new evidence" justifying a "new trial," defendant also alleged that 
Judge Glasmann had not fully complied with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in 
taking defendant's pleas (R. 36-46, 58-62; R.82: 2-7). The State opposed the motion as 
untimely (R. 48-55; R.82: 9-10). 
The trial court concluded that defendant's motion was untimely and, therefore, under 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6 (1999), mdState v. Price, 837 P.2d 578,583 (Utah App. 1992), 
the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits (R. 67-68; R.82: 10-14). See Addendum 
B (Findings, Conclusions, and Order). Defendant timely appealed (R. 69). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 12, 2000, around 6:50 p.m., nineteen-year-old Tiffany Warner and her 
friend, Paul Delacruz, were properly stopped in a left-hand turn lane at the intersection of 
State Road [SR] 79 and Parker Drive in Ogden, Utah (R.79: 8,13-14,17). Two other cars, 
Sally Boucher's and John Low's, were in front of Tiffany, also waiting to turn left (R.79:8). 
Defendant was driving westbound on SR 79 (R.79: 9, 14, 41). He was drunk and 
4 
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talking on a cell phone (R.79: 18-19). As he approached the Parker Drive intersection, he 
switched lanes and entered the left-hand turn lane going 50 mph (R.79: 10-14; R.80: 6). 
Even though 55 mph was the posted speed limit for the roadway, if defendant had tried to 
turn left going 50 mph, he "would have ended up in the dirt median or the river or something 
like that" (R.79: 14). Without braking, he rear-ended Tiffany Warner's stationary vehicle 
(R.79: 16-17, 20-23, 43; R.80: 6; R.81: 6). 
The force of the impact propelled Tiffany's car 55.4 feet (R.79:15). Tiffany's car hit 
Boucher's car, which in turn hit Low's vehicle (R.79: 8, 13-16). Tiffany, her passenger, 
Paul Delacruz, and the drivers of the other two vehicles, Sally Boucher and John Low, were 
injured (R.79: 19-20; R.80: 6). Tiffany died three days after the accident (id.). At the time 
of her death, she was pregnant; her unborn child died with her (id.). 
Police and paramedics arrived at the accident scene. When Officer William Mills 
spoke to defendant, he noticed a strong smell of alcohol on defendant's breath and person 
(R. 79: 17). Inside defendant's car was an open cooler, containing 9 empty 12-ounce beers 
(R.79: 18). In response to a request for his license, defendant produced a VISA card (R.79: 
10).4 
Officer Mills handed defendant over to Officer Michael Hunt (R.79: 31). Officer 
Hunt also smelled alcohol on defendant (R.79: 34). Hunt asked defendant to perform 
standard field sobriety tests. Defendant failed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, exhibiting 
4
 Eventually, defendant produced his license and registration (R.79: 29). 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
six out of six signs of intoxication (R.79: 35). Defendant was unstable on his feet and 
exhibited slow motor skills (R.79: 34, 49-51). He attempted the "one-leg rise" by lifting a 
leg but immediately put it down and refused to do more field tests (R.79: 36). In Officer 
Hunt's opinion, defendant was intoxicated to the point of impairment (id.). Defendant's level 
of intoxication was subsequently determined to be .22 by breath and .25 by blood, or three 
times the legal limit (R.79: 38, 40; R.80: 6; R.81: 6). 
When asked, defendant did not claim that any vehicle or physical disabilities 
contributed to the accident (R.79: 35,43). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A trial court is without jurisdiction to consider an untimely motion to withdraw a plea. 
Defendant has presented no basis for this Court to reverse the trial court's proper recognition 
of this limitation, or to overrule the case law upon which the trial court's decision is based. 
However, an appellate court may consider the merits of an untimely motion to 
withdraw for the first time on appeal if the defendant establishes "plain error" or 
"exceptional circumstances" justifying de novo review. In this case, defendant has failed to 
establish either exception. 
In taking defendant's pleas, the trial court strictly complied with all but one of the 
requirements of rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. But the court's failure to inform 
the defendant of the possibility of consecutive sentences, as required under rule 11, was not 
prejudicial in this case: defendant's sentences were concunent. Similarly, even if other 
6 
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errors occurred, defendant has not demonstrated that any error was "plain," that is, obvious 
and prejudicial. In other words, defendant has failed to establish that the trial court should 
have know that defendant's pleas were not knowing and voluntary. 
Similarly, defendant has not established exceptional circumstances to justify review 
of his untimely motion to withdraw for the first time on appeal. The evidence indicates that 
faulty brakes did not contribute to the accident. Moreover, mechanical failure is always a 
possibility in a car accident, irrespective of a formal recall notice. If defendant had doubted 
his criminal culpability, he should not have entered into a plea bargain. But having 
voluntarily and knowingly done so, he is not entitled to renege on that bargain merely 
because he now believes he has a better defense. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT!5 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT IT LACKED 
JURISDICTIONTOCONSIDER DEFENDANTSUNTIMELYMOTION 
TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEAS; DEFENDANT HAS PROVIDED 
NO BASIS TO OVERTURN EITHER THAT RULING OR THE 
UNDERLYING AUTHORITY ON WHICH IT WAS PREDICATED 
Utah law is clear. A defendant has only 30 days to move to withdraw a guilty plea. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6 (1999). Thereafter, a trial court loses jurisdiction to consider 
5
 Defendant's first point addresses the merits of his untimely motion to withdraw. 
See Brief of Appellant [Br. App.J at 1. However, the merits of an untimely motion to 
withdraw cannot be considered for the first time on appeal unless defendant establishes 
"plain error" or "exceptional circumstances." See State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, f 7, 
996 P.2d 1065, cert, granted, 9 P.3d 170 (Utah 2000). The State has, therefore, reversed 
the order of the issues: the State's Point I addresses defendant's Point III. 
7 
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the motion. State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 583 (Utah App. 1992). See also State v. 
Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, f 10,5 P.3d 1222; State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, f7,996 
P.2d 1065, cert, granted, 9 P.3d 170 (Utah 2000). 
Defendant entered his pleas on April 19,2000, and was advised he had only 30 days 
to move to withdraw them (R.80: 8). See Price, 837 P.2d at 583 (defendant must be 
informed of 30-day limitation for limitation to be jurisdictional). See also Utah R. Crim. P. 
11(f) (failure to inform a defendant of 30-day limitation may be grounds to extend time for 
filing motion to withdraw). On June 14, 2000, approximately 55 days after entering his 
pleas, defendant moved to "set aside his sentence and withdraw his pleas or alternatively for 
a new trial" (R. 34-46). The trial court found the motion untimely and denied it (R. 63-64, 
67-68). See Addendum B (Findings, Conclusions, and Order). 
On appeal, defendant does not directly challenge the trial court's ruling. Instead, he 
attacks the ruling's underlying rationale by asking this Court to overrule Price. Twice, the 
Court has rejected an opportunity to do so. See Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, f 10; Ostler, 
2000 UT App 28, f 7. Stare decisis likewise precludes addressing defendant's argument in 
this case. See Ostler, id. 
But even if Price were subject to challenge, defendant has not articulated a basis to 
do so here. Defendant presents no argument to overrule Price in his brief; instead, he refers 
to the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association [LDA]'s cross-petition in State v. Ostler, and 
attaches LDA's argument in his addenda. See Br.App. at 26-27. This procedure does not 
8 
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comply with rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, 
f6, 1 P.3d 1108 (refusing to consider argument which is inadequately briefed). More 
significantly, incorporating LDA's argument does not meet defendant's "heavy burden" in 
seeking to overturn precedent. See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994) 
(recognizing heavy burden of persuasion on party seeking to overrule precedent), cert. 
denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995). When defendant attached LDA's cross-petition to his brief, 
LDA's argument had already been explicitly rejected by this Court in Ostler, 2000 UT App 
28, f 7, and implicitly rejected by the supreme court in denying the cross-petition. See 
Addendum C (Order Granting State's Petition for Certiorari, State v. Ostler, No. 20000287-
SC). Defendant's reliance on LDA's cross-petition is, therefore, misplaced. 
For these reasons, the Court should summarily refuse to consider defendant's 
challenge to Price and affirm the trial court's ruling that it lacked jurisdiction. 
POINTlf 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED PLAIN ERROR IN THE 
TAKING OF HIS GUILTY PLEAS, AND THEREFORE, HAS PROVIDED 
NO BASIS FOR THIS COURT TO CONSIDER HIS UNTIMELY 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
Defendant argues that even if his motion was untimely, this Court should review its 
merits because the trial court committed five "plain" errors in taking his pleas. See Br. App. 
at 19-22. While the trial court did fail to comply with one requirement of rule 11, Utah Rules 
6
 This point addresses defendant's Point I. 
9 
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of Criminal Procedure, in taking the pleas, neither that omission nor any of the other alleged 
errors rise to "plain error." 
The Distinct Requirements of Plain Error 
Two different standards apply in reviewing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. 
If a defendant timely moves to withdraw his guilty plea, he need only demonstrate to 
the trial court "good cause" to permit withdrawal. See Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 9; UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 77-13-6(2). Establishment of prejudice is not required. Noncompliance with 
rule 11 is sufficient. See State v. Mills, 898 P.2d 819, 821-22 (Utah App. 1995). For if a 
"trial court failed to strictly comply with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
in taking the defendant's guilty plea, and subsequently denies the withdrawal of the plea, the 
trial court has exceeded its permitted range of discretion as a matter of law."7 Id. See also 
Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988,991 n.6 (Utah 1993) (recognizing that on direct appeal 
from denial of timely motion to withdraw, lack of strict compliance alone justifies reversal). 
But different requirements apply when, as in this case, a defendant seeks review of 
an untimely motion to withdraw. Cf Salazar, 852 P.2d at 991-92 (recognizing that lack of 
strict compliance is not sufficient to set aside guilty plea on collateral review). Because an 
untimely motion deprives the trial court of jurisdiction, see Price, 837 P.2d at 583, the merits 
7
 "Strict compliance, however, does not mandate a particular script or rote 
recitation of the rights." State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, fl 1. Instead, "strict compliance" 
means that the judge has established on the record defendant's knowing and voluntary 
waiver of the rights delineated in rule 11. Id. 
10 
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of the untimely motion may be considered for the first time on appeal only if the defendant 
establishes "plain error" or "exceptional circumstances."8 Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, f 8. 
To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993). Harmfiilness, that is prejudice, is established when 
the appellate court's confidence in the outcome is undermined. Id. at 1208-09. In the plea 
context, this requires a showing that the plea was not knowing and voluntarily entered. Cf. 
State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, fflf 11 & 13 ("Strict compliance does not require a specific 
method of communicating the rights enumerated by rule 11"; ultimate goal is to ensure that 
defendant understands the "basic consequences" of the constitutional rights he is waiving). 
While noncompliance with rule 11 may establish error and, in some cases, even 
obvious error, it does not necessarily establish prejudice. A "voluntary and knowing" guilty 
8
 Ostler is presently before the Utah Supreme Court on certiorari review. See 
Addendum C (Order Granting Certiorari). The State recognizes Ostler as precedent, but 
respectively continues to challenge its reasoning. 
An appellate court's legal authority to hear and determine the merits of a claim on 
direct appeal extends no further that of the trial court. Steel Company v. Citizens for a 
Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83,101-03 (1998); BurtA Carlquist Co. v. Marks, 111 P. 
224,226 (Utah 1918); Yearian v. Speirs, 10 P. 609, 617 (Utah 1886), overruled on other 
grounds, People v. Douglass, 14 P. 801 (Utah 1887). In Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, f 8, 
this Court properly recognized the trial court's lack of jurisdiction, but then improperly 
used the doctrines of plain error and exceptional circumstances, judicially-created 
exceptions to the preservation rule, to create appellate jurisdiction where none legally 
existed. In so doing, the Court violated the axiom that a court may not unilaterally 
expand its own jurisdiction beyond that authorized by law. Steel Company, 523 U.S. at 
94; Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, f 8, 5 P.3d 649. 
Oral argument in Ostler is anticipated for early 2001. 
11 
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plea does not require strict compliance with rule 11 to be constitutionally sound under either 
the federal or state constitution. See Salazar, 852 P.2d at 991-92. "Rule 11 is a device for 
protecting the right [of voluntariness] but the scope of Rule 11 does not equal the more 
limited scope of the constitutional right." Id. at 992 (quotation and citation omitted). 
Instead, compliance with rule 11 merely "creates a presumption that the plea was voluntarily 
entered." Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f l l . And while the "substantive goal of rule 11 is to 
ensure that defendants know of their rights and thereby understand the basic consequences 
of their decision to plead guilty," that goal "should not be overshadowed or undermined by 
formalistic ritual." Visser, 2000 UT 88, f l 1. 
In sum, the test for prejudice is not driven by the requirements of rule 11, but by 
traditional plain error analysis. Defendant must establish that any obvious error impacted the 
plea to the degree that the appellate court no longer has confidence in its underlying validity, 
that is, that the plea was less than knowing and voluntary. Cf. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09; 
Visser, 2000 UT 88, ff 11-14. 
Moreover, appellate courts have refused to "give defendants the benefit of traditional 
plain error analysis where doing so would create an incentive for invited error." State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f31, 405 Utah Adv. Rep. 14. Indeed, in the context of a plea 
hearing, this Court has recognized the "important policy underlying the general rule" 
requiring objection, "which is that the trial court's attention should be called to potential 
error so that it may attend to it expeditiously and effectively, correcting any problems and 
12 
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obviating the need for appellate or collateral proceedings." State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5,6 n. 1 
(Utah App. 1966), cert, denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997). For this reason, appellate courts 
should also not allow counsel to remain silent while a plea is taken, and then permit the same 
counsel to claim on appeal that plain error occurred. Cf. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337,343 
(Utah 1997); Irwin, 924 P.2d at 6 n.l Yet, this is what has occurred here. 
Appellate counsel represented defendant when he entered his guilt pleas. At the end 
of the colloquy, the judge asked defendant if he had any questions for either the court or his 
counsel; defendant said he did not (R.80: 7). If counsel believed at that point that 
defendant's pleas were not voluntary and knowing, counsel was obligated to speak up - not 
only to permit the judge to correct any omissions, but also to ensure that his client fully 
understood the rights he was waiving. 
The dangers of invited error are even more acute after Ostler. Without a restriction 
on counsel's ability to raise plain error on appeal, trial counsel may now permit a defective 
plea to be entered and forego a timely motion to withdraw so that defendant can "preview" 
his sentence. If the sentence is advantageous, he can remain silent. If the sentence involves 
substantial incarceration, as in this case, counsel may then file an untimely motion to 
withdraw, have it summarily denied by the trial court pursuant to Price, and yet, under 
Ostler, seek untimely review of the merits by arguing plain error on appeal. This is the very 
potential for abuse which Utah appellate courts have cautioned against in permitting plain 
error analysis. See, e.g., Lit her land, 2000 UT 76, f 31; Brown, 948 P.2d at 343. 
13 
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In sum, Ostler permits plain error analysis of an untimely motion to withdraw. But 
in engaging in that analysis, plain error should not be expanded beyond its traditional 
confines. 
* * * 
Turning to the facts, defendant entered his negotiated pleas the same day he was 
bound over. No plea affidavit was used; instead, the court directly engaged defendant in a 
colloquy (R.80: 1-8). See Addendum D (Plea Colloquy). Each of defendant's allegations 
of plain error is discussed below. 
Allegation that Defendant was not Informed of his Right to Compel 
Witnesses 
Defendant asserts that the trial judge plainly erred in not informing defendant of his 
right to "compel the attendance of defense witnesses." See Br.App. at 21. See also UTAH 
R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(3). Defendant's claim is without merit 
Defendant admits that the trial judge informed defendant of his right to "confront and 
cross-examine the State's witnesses against you" and to "call witnesses of your own" (R.80: 
4). As used, the term "call'* is equivalent to "compel." See Webster's New International 
Unabridged Dictionary, 3rd Ed. (1993) at 317-18 (call: "demand . . . command . . . to 
summon (to testify in court)"). 
Failure to use the exact language of rule 11 does not constitute error. Visser, 2000 UT 
88,111. 
14 
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Allegation that Defendant was not Informed that his Plea was an Admission 
Defendant contends that the trial judge plainly erred by not informing defendant that 
his pleas constituted admissions of the elements of the crimes. See Br.App. at 21. See also 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(A). At the same time, defendant admits the court informed him 
of the elements. See Br. App. at 21. In context, defendant's claim is without merit. 
The court fully informed defendant of the State's burden to establish the elements, and 
fully articulated what those elements were (R.80: 4-5). The court next had the prosecutor 
state in detail the factual basis for the pleas and then explained that the stated facts were what 
the State claimed it could prove at trial (R.80: 5-6). See Addendum D (Plea Colloquy). The 
colloquy continued: 
Court: Are you pleading guilty to these two counts because you are in fact 
guilty? 
Defendant: Yes, your honor. 
Court And is the description that I have just been given and what I describe 
by way of the charging documents from the State, is that an accurate 
description of what happened? 
Defense Counsel: I think there's some disagreement as to the speed he was 
traveling when the accident happened, but to the extent that we feel confident 
the State could prove criminal negligence we do - he does acknowledge that. 
So other that modest - it's just a factual disagreement. 
Court. Is that correct, Mr. Chatelain? 
Defendant Yes, sir. 
(R.80: 6-7). 
15 
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Again, while the exact words of rule 11 were not used, the rule's substantive meaning 
was clearly conveyed. See Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 13 ("Strict compliance does not require a 
specific method of communicating the rights enumerated by rule 11."). Defendant knew that 
by pleading guilty he was admitting to the truth of the facts as alleged by the State. 
Therefore, no error, much less plain error, occurred. 
Allegation that Defendant was not Informed of the Possibility of Consecutive 
Sentences 
Defendant's claim that defendant was not informed of the possibility of consecutive 
sentences is supported by the record. The court explained the maximum length of the 
potential sentences, but did not inform defendant that those sentences might be imposed 
consecutively. See UTAH R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(5) (requiring that a defendant be informed of the 
applicable penalties, including the possibility of imposition of consecutive sentences). 
This omission, however, was not prejudicial: defendant received concurrent sentences 
(R. 30-31). Cf.Statev. Marvin, 964 P.2d313,317(Utah 1998) (recognizing harmless nature 
of alleged breach of plea agreement where condition was otherwise met). Defendant's lack 
of knowledge of a hypothetical possibility - which did not, in fact, occur - does not 
undermine the voluntary and knowing nature of his pleas. 
Allegation that Defendant was not Informed of his Right to a Speedy Trial 
Defendant claims that the trial court did not fully inform defendant of his "right to a 
speedy, public trial before an impartial jury." See BrApp. at 21. See also UTAH R. CRIM. 
P. 11(e)(3). However, defendant admits that defendant was informed of his "right to go to 
16 
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trial before a judge or a jury" (R.80: 4). Defendant does not dispute the implication that the 
judge or jury would be impartial, only whether the trial would be "speedy." See Br. App. at 
21. However, under the circumstances of this case, it is clear that defendant understood his 
right to a speedy disposition. Compare Visser, 200 UT 88, ff 13-14 (speedy trial inquiry 
adequate in light of actual proceedings), with Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App. 186, f 17 (plain 
error established based on speedy trial omissions). 
Defendant was charged eight days after the accident, and five days after Tiffany had 
died (R. 1 -4,10-11). His counsel immediately demanded a jury trial (R. 17-18). While still 
at the preliminary hearing stage, defendant decided to enter into the plea bargain (R.25-27; 
R.80: 2). The same day he was bound over, he entered his guilty pleas (id.). After entry of 
the pleas, defendant was sentenced as quickly as a presentence report could be prepared and 
his counsel available (R. 29-31; R.80: 8-9). As a result, defendant was convicted of his 
crimes within 6 months of committing them (R. 1-4; R. 29-31). 
The record supports that defendant understood his right to a speedy disposition of the 
charges at the time he entered his pleas. See Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 13. Indeed, one of 
defendant's acknowledged goals was to quickly dispose of the matter before Judge Glasmann 
retired. See discussion, supra, at3n. 1. But even if this Court concludes that error occurred, 
no prejudice resulted: defendant's proceedings were in fact speedy. See id.; Marvin, 964 
P.2dat318. 
17 
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Allegation that Defendant was not Informed that his Plea Waived his Rights 
Defendant claims that the trial judge plainly erred in not informing defendant that by 
entering guilty pleas, he waived the various rights enumerated during the colloquy. See Br. 
App. at 21. See also Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3). 
The court did not proceed by explaining one right and Ihen asking if defendant waived 
that right. Instead, the judge explained the various rights which attached if defendant 
proceeded to trial (R.80: 3-4). The court then explained that if defendant went to trial, he 
could appeal "from what had occurred during that trial" (R.80:4). But if he gave up his right 
to trial, "you are going to give up that right of appeal, does that make sense" (id.). Defendant 
responded it did (id.). 
An ideal colloquy would be more specific. Nevertheless, in context, it is clear that 
defendant fairly understood the "basic consequences" of entering his plea, in this instance, 
that by pleading guilty he was giving up constitutional rights that he would have been entitled 
to if he had gone to trial. See Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 11. Moreover, as stated, supra, at 12-
13, it behooved counsel to bring any deficiencies in the colloquy to the trial court's attention. 
For all these reasons, defendant has failed to establish plain error in the taking of his 
guilty pleas. With the exception of the court's failure to inform defendant of the possibility 
of consecutive sentences, no errors occurred. But even if Court were to determine that any 
other error occurred, defendant has failed to establish that any omission prejudiced him, that 
is, undermined confidence in the knowing and voluntary nature of defendant's pleas. 
18 
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POINTIIf 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED "EXCEPTIONAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES, "AND THEREFORE, HAS PROVIDED NO BASIS 
FOR THIS COURT TO CONSIDER HIS UNTIMELY MOTION TO 
WITHDRA W FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
Defendant next asserts that the manufacturer's recall notice constituted "new 
evidence" which was "not previously known or discoverable and under the facts of this case 
should have been considered to be so exceptional as to permit defendant to withdraw his plea 
and proceed to trial." See Br.App. at 24. Defendant claims that prior to the GMC notice, 
"there was no reason to expect that defendant's braking system had in any way contributed 
to this accident." Id. at 25. 
Defendant never raised the possibility of mechanical failure until his sentencing. 
When questioned at the time of the accident, defendant did not claim that his car was not 
functioning properly (R.79:35,43). During the preliminary hearing, counsel cross-examined 
Officer Mills about the absence of skid marks and braking marks (R.79: 20-23). Counsel 
then was granted additional time to present argument that the evidence did not constitute 
criminal negligence (R.79:56-57). Three weeks later, defendant affirmatively abandoned this 
issue by withdrawing his motion and entering into a plea bargain (R. 25-27). 
In choosing to plead guilty, defendant fully understood the strength of the evidence 
against him. In his own words, he "ran somebody in the back"(R.79:43). He was drunk, at 
9
 This point responds to defendant's Point II. 
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a level three times the legal limit, was talking on a cell phone while driving at a high rate of 
speed into a turn lane, and failed to brake before hitting a line of stationary cars. See 
Statement of Facts at 4-6. 
The recall notice did not change the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 
charges. The notice, at best, only provided a possible defense, i.e., mechanical failure, 
which defense had always been available to defendant irrespective of the recall notice. 
Significantly, the manufacturer could not, however, determine if the recalled brake switch 
malfunctioned on January 12,2000, the date of the accident (R.81: 2,9). Only defendant's 
own explanation of the accident, in which he did not claim that he had ever applied the 
brakes, or a timely examination of his vehicle could have done that. Apparently, however, 
neither did (R.79: 43; R.81: 8-10). 
In any case, the issue is not whether the recall notice provides a viable defense, but 
whether the existence of the recall creates an "exceptional circumstance," a "rare, procedural 
anomaly," to justify setting aside the pleas. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209 n.3. It does not. 
Compare Price, 837 P.2d at 584 (rejecting claim that neighbor's belief in defendant's 
innocence constituted "new" evidence or exceptional circumstances); with State v. Gallegos, 
738 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Utah 1987) (reversing denial of timely motion to withdraw where 
victim of sexual assault recanted her testimony). 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly determined that it was without jurisdiction to consider the 
merits of defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas. This Court is likewise precluded from 
considering the merits because defendant has not established plain error or exceptional 
circumstances. Defendant's convictions should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Q & day of November, 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General- ^ 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Plaintiff/Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to BRIAN R. FLORENCE, attorney for 
Defendant/Appellant, 5890 Harrison Boulevard, Ogden, UT 84403, this ofl£. day of 
November, 2000. 
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77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea. 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause 
shown and with leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by 
motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under 
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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389 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 11 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am.Jur.2d.-21Am.Jur. 2d Criminal Law C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 355 et 
§ 589 et seq. seq. 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be 
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The 
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a 
reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason 
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative 
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or 
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly 
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant 
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(5> the defendant know* the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable; the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that 
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if die tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, aAd if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if used, an affidavit reciting these factors after the court has established 
that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the 
affidavit. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be 
sufficient that the affidavit has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
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Rule 11 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 390 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included 
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by 
the court. 
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall 
advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not 
binding on the court. 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement 
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge 
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the 
proposed disposition will be approved. 
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in confor-
mity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then 
call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a 
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no 
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion., A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to 
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a 
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
(Amended effective May 1,1993; January 1,1996; November 1,1997.) 
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CAMILLE L. NEIDER 7266 _ \\VL^ 
SANDRA L. CORP 4411 I CluRT J ^ 
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., 2ND FLOOR-'- 20 P 3 21 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
TELEPHONE: (801) 399-8377 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
COREY D. CHATELAIN, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE SENTENCE & 
PERMIT WITHDRAWAL OF 
PLEA OR ALTERNATIVELY 
FOR A NEW TRIAL 
CaseNo.001900281 
Judge: W. BRENT WEST 
On July 5,2000, the Court heard arguments on Defendant's motions to withdraw his plea 
or for a new trial. Defendant was present with counsel, Brian R. Florence. The State was 
represented by Sandra L. Corp and Camille L. Neider, Deputy County Attorneys. Based upon the 
written memoranda and oral arguments, the Court enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant pled guilty to Automobile Homicide, a second degree felony, and Driving a 
Vehicle under the Influence of Alcohol, a class A misdemeanor, on April 19,2000 before Judge 
Michael Glasmann. 
2. On June 7,2000, Defendant appeared before this Court for sentencing and made an 
oral motion to withdraw his plea which was denied on that date. 
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3. The Court sentenced defendant to the Utah State Prison for a term of one to fifteen 
years on the second degree felony and a concurrent term of one year in jail for the class A 
misdemeanor on June 7, 2000. 
4. Defendant filed this motion on June 13, 2000, in writing. 
5. Both the oral motion and the written motions to withdraw the plea were made more 
than 30 days after entry of the plea. 
6. No trial was held due to defendant's plea of guilty. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The provision in Section 77-13-6(2) allowing only 30 days after entry of a plea for a 
motion to withdraw the plea is jurisdictional and this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the 
merits of defendant's motions to withdraw his plea because they were filed more than 30 days 
after entry of the plea. 
2. The Court cannot consider defendant's motion for a new trial because no trial was 
held in this case. 
3. There was no illegality in defendant's sentence allowing the Court to consider a 
motion to correct an illegal sentence. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing findings and conclusions, defendant's motion is denied. 
DATED this tt day of July, 2000. 
Approved as to form this n 
Brian R. Florence W. BRENT WEST 
Attorney for Defendant District Court Judge 
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JUL ' l 3 209fe SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
] i 
APPrA!.$ ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
v. 
Christopher Blain Ostler, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
FILED 
UTAH SUPREME COUFT 
!Ui ' 2 200C 
PAT BARTHOLOMEW 
CLERK OF THE COUP" 
No. 20000287-SC 
981308-CA 
985101649 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed pursuant to Rule 48, of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari filed on April 12, 2000, by petitioner is granted. 
Review will be limited to deciding whether the Court of 
Appeals had jurisdiction to decide the merits of a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea, once it concluded that the trial court 
lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits. 
Ih 2W? 
FOR THE COURT: 
*hard C. Howe 
Chief Justice 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on July _\3^, 2000, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was hand-delivered to a personal 
representative of the Legal Defender's Office to be delivered to 
the party listed below: 
JOAN C. WATT 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 E 500 S STE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand-
delivered to a personal representative of the Attorney General's 
Office to be delivered to the party listed below: 
CHRISTINE SOLTIS 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited 
in the United States mail to the trial court listed below: 
THIRD DISTRICT, WEST VALLEY 
ATTN: JANET (EXT. 2407) 
3636 CONSTITUTION BLVD 
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84119 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand 
delivered to a personal representative of the court(s) listed 
below: 
JULIA D'ALESANDRO 
COURT OF APPEALS 
4 50 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 140230 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230 
BvJ(Mk J r 
Deputy Clerk 
Case No. 20000287-SC 
THIRD DISTRICT, WEST VALLEY , 985101649 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE 
COREY 
OF 
D. 
UTAH, 
VS 
PLAINTIFF, ) 
CHATELAIN, ) 
DEFENDANT. ) 
AUGC-
- ' ••*. 
VIDEOTAPED TRANSCRIPT 
CASE NO. 001900281 
PLEA HEARING 
* * * * * 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL G. GLASMANN 
2525 GRANT AVENUE 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
APRIL 19, 2000 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
MS. CAMILLE NEIDER 
MS. SANDRA CORP 
MR. BRIAN R. FLORENCE*-
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CO 
.ED 
1 7 2000 
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at 
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1 A p r i l 19 , 2000 
2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 THE COURT: Thank you. Let's see, Mr. Florence, 
4 are you ready with your.... 
5 MR. FLORENCE: I am. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. Letfs see, I just looked at 
7 that, it's 14 on the calender. The State versus Corey 
8 Chatelain. As I understand it, this is the case, isn't it, 
9 that the preliminary hearing was conducted by Judge Lyon? 
10 MR. FLORENCE: That's correct. 
11 THE COURT: And that there has been a bindover? 
12 MR. FLORENCE: That's correct. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. Where are we at at this time? 
14 MR. FLORENCE: Mr. Chatelain is going to enter a 
15 plea. It's my understanding that he will enter a plea to 
16 one of the second degree felony, automobile homicides and 
17 one of the DUIs and the other two then will be dismissed. 
18 THE COURT: So we have four counts. Would he be 
19 pleading guilty then to Count I the second degree felony, 
20 automobile homicide and Count III? 
21 I MR. FLORENCE: I -- that's not been discussed but 
22 it makes no difference to us. 
23 MS. CORP: And that's fine with us, any of the 
24 counts is fine. 
25 MR. FLORENCE: Is it? 
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MS. NEIDER: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. Apparently I don't have the file 
here, it's with Judge Lyon's clerk, so...Again, the 
negotiation, let me just make sure I understand it, Mr. 
Florence, is that he would plead to automobile homicide and 
one count of driving under the influence of alcohol? 
MR. FLORENCE: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Is there anything else to the 
negotiation? 
MR. FLORENCE: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Chatelain, has anything else been 
promised to you that ought to be disclosed at this time to 
the Court? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you speak, read and 
write the English language? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you have a clear mind today? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Are you under the influence of any 
alcohol or drugs? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Are you under the influence of any 
medications that would be clouding your thinking at this 
time? 
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1 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
2 THE COURT: Do you understand that you don't have 
3 to plead guilty; that you have the right to go to trial 
4 before a judge or a jury? 
5 THE DEPENDANT: Yes, I do, 
6 THE COURT: If you chose to do that you could 
7 confront and cross-examine the Statefs witnesses against 
8 you, you could call witnesses of your own and you could also 
9 testify but you cannot be made to testify against yourself 
10 and that's because you have a right against 
11 self-incrimination, do you understand that? 
12 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
13 THE COURT: Also if you went to trial and you were 
14 then convicted, you could appeal from what had occurred 
15 during that trial. If you give up your right to a trial, 
16 you are going to give up that right of appeal, does that 
17 make sense? 
18 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
19 THE COURT: All right. You are presumed to be 
20 innocent. In order for the State to prove your guilt it 
21 must prove each element of the offense that you are charged 
22 with beyond a reasonable doubt. 
23 Under Count I, the State would have to prove that on 
24 January the 12th of 2000, that you committed a second degree 
25 felony, automobile homicide. They would have to prove that 
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1 you operated a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol 
2 content of .08 percent or greater by weight, or while under 
3 the influence of alcohol or any drug with a combined 
4 influence of alcohol and any drug, to a degree which 
5 rendered you incapable of safely operating a vehicle and 
6 that you caused the death of Tiffany Warner by operating the 
7 motor vehicle in a criminally negligent manner. Do you 
8 understand what the State would have to prove? 
9 THE DEPENDANT: Yes, sir, 
10 THE COURT: Under Count III, the State would have 
11 to prove that you committed a Class A Misdemeanor, driving 
12 under the influence of alcohol or drugs. And basically they 
13 would have to prove that you were in actual physical of a 
14 motor vehicle, that you were under the influence of alcohol 
15 or drugs or some combination of them to the point that it 
16 impaired your ability to safely operate the vehicle, and 
17 that as a proximate result of operating such vehicle in a 
18 negligent manner that you inflicted injury upon Paul 
19 Delacruz, that's taken from Count III. Do you understand 
20 what the State would have to prove under that count? 
21 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
22 THE COURT: Does the State want to state anything 
23 further by way of a factual basis? 
24 MS. NEIDER: Yes, Judge. I think it would be 
25 important for the Court to note that itfs the State's 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 position that the criminal negligence in this case was that 
2 he was driving approximately 50 miles an hour. The three 
3 cars that were struck were stopped at a red light in a 
4 turning lane, he hit the back, the third vehicle which was 
5 the vehicle that Tiffany Warner was in and Mr. Delacruz was 
6 in. She did suffer head injuries that caused her death and 
7 Mr. Delacruz did have some physical injuries. She -- I'm 
8 sorry, the defendant did some alcohol tests subsequently and 
9 the test was a .25 -- or .22 on the breathalyser and .25 on 
10 the blood draw. 
11 THE COURT: Do you understand that's what the State 
12 claims it.could prove in this case? 
13 THE DEPENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty to these two 
15 counts because you are in fact guilty? 
16 THB DEPENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
17 THB COURT: And is the description that I have just 
18 been given and what I describe by way of the charging 
19 documents from the State, is that an accurate description of 
20 what happened? 
21 MR. FLORENCE: I think there's some disagreement as 
22 to the speed he was traveling when the accident happened, 
23 but to the extent that we feel confident the State could 
24 prove criminal negligence we do -- he does acknowledge that. 
25 So other than that modest -- it's just a factual 
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1 disagreement. 
2 THE COURT: Is that correct, Mr. Chatelain? 
3 THE DEPENDANT: Yes, sir. 
4 THE COURT: Is anyone threatening you to cause you 
5 to plead guilty today? 
6 THE DEPENDANT: No, your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Do you understand that the maximum 
8 penalty for the second degree felony which is what is in 
9 Count I, the automobile homicide, that that maximum penalty 
10 is one to 15 years at the state prison and up to a $10,000 
11 fine? 
12 THE DEPENDANT: Yes, I do. 
13 THE COURT: That the maximum penalty for the Class 
14 A Misdemeanor, which is Count III and that's the DUI with 
15 the injury, that that maximum penalty is a year in jail and 
16 up to a $2,500 fine? 
17 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
18 THE COURT: All right. Have you had an adequate 
19 chance to talk with your attorney, Mr. Florence, about what 
20 you are doing today? 
21 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I have. 
22 THE COURT: Do you have any questions either for 
23 him or for me as the judge before you plead guilty to these 
24 charges? 
25 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
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1 THE COURT: I'll ask you then as to Count I, a 
2 second degree felony, automobile homicide, how do you plead? 
3 THE DEFENDANT: Guilty, your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: That was guilty, was it? 
5 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
6 THE COURT: As to Count III, a Class A Misdemeanor, 
7 driving a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs, 
8 how do you plead? 
9 THE DEFENDANT: Guilty, your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: The Court finds that you've knowingly 
11 and voluntarily entered those two pleas. Does the State 
12 move to dismiss Counts II and IV? 
13 I MS. CORP: Yes, Judge. 
14 THE COURT: Counts II and IV are dismissed. You 
15 have 30 days from today within which to file a motion to 
16 withdraw the pleas you've just entered. Filing that motion 
17 doesn't mean it would be granted but if you don't file it in 
18 30 days it's not timely, do you understand that? 
19 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
20 THE COURT: All right. We need to continue this 
21 case now for sentencing. 
22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Your Honor, if we could 
23 continue this to May 31st. 
24 MR. FLORENCE: Could we either go the week before 
25 or the week after that? I'm going to be in trial in Logan 
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1 on the 31st of May. 
2 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Possibly put it back then to 
3 June 7th. 
4 THE COURT: Does that date work then, Mr. Florence? 
5 MR, FLORENCE: It does, 
6 THE COURT: All right. We'll continue this case to 
7 June the 7th at 2 o'clock for sentencing. They'll give you 
8 a referral slip before you leave the courtroom so that you 
9 know where to go and you need to go over immediately and 
10 contact the probation office to help them prepare the 
11 presentence report. 
12 If there's anyone in the audience that's been 
13 interested in this case and would like to speak at the time 
14 of sentencing, the sentencing will be on June the 7th at 
15 I 2 o'clock in this courtroom, 
16 I MR. FLORENCE: Thank you, Judge. 
17 THE COURT: Thank you. 
18 I MS. NEIDER: Thank you, Judge. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 I TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE 
2 
3 I STATE OF UTAH ) 
4 : SS. 
5 I COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
6 
7 1 I, Tracy A. Covington, do hereby state the 
8 following: That I was not present at the 
9 foregoing proceedings; That the foregoing proceedings 
10 were taken by videotape and thereafter transcribed 
11 and proofread by me using computer-aided transcription 
12 software. 
13 That the same constitutes a true and correct 
14 transcription of the foregoing videotaped proceedings 
15 to the best of my ability. 
16 That I am not of kin or otherwise associated 
17 with any of the parties herein or their counsel, and 
18 that I am not interested in the events thereof, 
19 WITNESS my hand at Ogden City, Utah, 
20 J this 4th day of August, 2000. 
21 
22 
23 | Transcriber 
24 
TRACY A. COVINGTON 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
